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ABSTRACT 
After the events of 9/11, the number of fusion centers rapidly multiplied. As a result, 
state and local agencies that operated the centers adopted a myriad of policies. This thesis 
seeks to answer how fusion centers can implement policies as to operational structure and 
transparency that simultaneously safeguard against abuse of citizens’ privacy while 
facilitating the collection, maintenance, and dissemination of information.  
Two methods of research are utilized: policy analysis and policy options analysis. 
This thesis examines existing federal guidelines, federal case law, and various federal 
statutes and regulations. Moreover, the thesis explores three policy options as possible 
decision-making tools for fusion centers: 1) mandatory federal guidelines, 2) imposition 
of a balancing test and administrative review process, and 3) a compulsory reasonable-
suspicion requirement. In the end, this thesis recommends imposition of all three policies. 
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The 9/11 Commission identified four types of failure that contributed to the 
successful attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon: failures in imagination, 
policy, capabilities, and management (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 
the United States [9/11 Commission], 2004). The Commission also made a number of 
recommendations designed to prevent such failures in the future. The creation and 
operation of fusion centers was a concept not included in the recommendations. 
Nevertheless, the Commission did acknowledge the critical nature of intelligence analysis 
and the need for information sharing. The Commission report stated: “The biggest 
impediment to all-source analysis—to a greater likelihood of connecting the dots–—is 
the human or systemic resistance to sharing information” (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 
416). 
According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as of 2008, there were 
72 fusion centers throughout the United States. DHS defines a fusion center as “a 
collaborative effort of 2 or more Federal, State, local, or tribal government agencies that 
combines resources, expertise, or information with the goal of maximizing the ability of 
such agencies to detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal or 
terrorist activity” (United States Department of Homeland Security [USDHS], 2008, 
p. 4). Fusion centers are not operated by the federal government, though federal agencies 
such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) often participate. Furthermore, many fusion centers rely entirely upon 
federal grants to support operations. State or local law enforcement agencies often direct 
the operation of the centers, and fusion centers vary in structure and operational 
procedures (and policies) from state to state. Nevertheless, fusion centers do share one 
aspect in common—the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information derived 
from a variety of sources. These activities have a profound impact upon the Fourth 
Amendment right to privacy guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the application of 
this right to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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The 9/11 Commission recognized the need to protect citizens’ privacy while 
sharing information. In the 9/11 Commission Report (2004), the commission 
recommended that “as the President determines the guidelines for information sharing 
among government agencies and by those agencies with the private sector, he should 
safeguard the privacy of individuals about whom information is shared” (9/11 
Commission, 2004, p. 394). This thesis focuses upon the development and 
implementation of the privacy policies of fusion centers and the need to simultaneously 
balance the protection of privacy and the factiliation of information sharing.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
1. Complex Governance Structures and Transparency 
The most controversial privacy issues regarding fusion centers derive from the 
complex governance structures and the transparency of the centers’ activities, i.e., the 
collection, analysis, and dissemination of information (Andino, 2008). For example, in 
2008 the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) filed a Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA) lawsuit against the Virginia State Police for refusing to provide requested 
information concerning the agency’s interaction with the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) as to the fusion center’s operation 
(Andino, 2008). Through the lawsuit the organization obtained a copy of a memorandum 
of understanding between the FBI and the Virginia State fusion center that required the 
center to consult with the FBI before responding to a FOIA request (Electronic Privacy 
Information Center [EPIC], 2009). By agreeing to the memorandum, the Virginia State 
fusion center significantly reduced the level of transparency as to its activities. This 
transparency was needed to ensure that the center provided adequate protection of 
privacy rights.  
Some fusion centers include private agencies as participants. Such an arrangement 
results in a complex governance structure because private agencies operate under a 
different governance structure than public agencies. These structures may compete with 
one another on several issues, such as data security. According to an American Civil 
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Liberties Union report entitled “What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers?” some centers 
utilize private companies to store and analyze data that includes personal information 
such as birth dates, social security numbers, credit reports, and employment history.  For 
example, the Texas Department of Homeland Security contracted with Northrop 
Grumman Corporation for such purposes after a number of evacuees from Hurricane 
Katrina arrived in Texas (German & Stanley, 2007). According to the Texas Observer, 
the project was unsuccessful due to security concerns surrounding the data: it was unclear 
who at the corporation had access to the data or the present status of the data (German & 
Stanley, 2007). 
2. Lack of Consistency and Coherence in Government Guidelines 
The federal government has recommended a number of privacy guidelines to 
address the crucial issues of governance structures and transparency via DHS and DOJ. 
There is no shortage of federal guidelines on the subject of privacy. DHS and DOJ’s 
Fusion Center Guidelines (USDHS & DOJ, 2006), DOJ’s Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Policy Development Guide and Implementation Template (DOJ, 2008), and DHS’s 
Privacy Impact Assessment for the Department of Homeland Security State, Local, and 
Regional Fusion Center Initiative (USDHS, 2008) provide a few examples. However, 
there is an overall lack of consistency and coherence as to the application of these 
guidelines. DHS has attempted to address the inconsistency. “DHS provides staffing, 
technical, and privacy and civil liberties training to fusion centers and collaborates with 
the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (“Global”), a DOJ entity, to deliver 
training” (Andino, 2008, p. 2). However, individual agencies that participate in fusion 
centers often adhere to their individual state’s privacy laws and agency’s policies. Such 
adherence encourages “policy shopping” according to the ACLU (German & Stanley, 
2007). Agencies may not host the data, as it would be prohibited by their individual 
agency’s policy, but access the data through other participants. For example, according to 
a Washington Post article “Centers Tap into Personal Databases,” the Ohio fusion center 
has been granted access to an FBI “secret level repository” (O’Harrow, 2008). Under  
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their agency’s policy, the Ohio State Police is not privy to such information. However, 
through their partnership with the FBI, the agency has access to the information 
contained in this repository. 
Such arrangements contribute significantly to the inconsistency and incoherence 
of guidelines. Permitting a fusion center to circumvent state law or operate outside of its 
established, approved policies contributes to the erosion of the very principles that state 
law or agency policy seek to uphold. Moreover, public discourse is stifled as to the 
appropriateness of such access because the official, transparent channels are avoided. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can fusion centers implement policies as to operational structure and 
transparency that simultaneously guard against the abuse of privacy rights and facilitate 
the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information? 
C. PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
This thesis will offer an in-depth analysis of the existing policies concerning 
privacy at fusion centers and the recommended guidelines by DOJ and DHS. It will also 
examine possible strategies and policies to address consistency and coherence problems 
surrounding governance structures and transparency issues of fusion centers’ collection, 
maintenance, and dissemination of personal data. In addition, the thesis will recommend 
the imposition of a policy designed to strike a balance between citizens’ privacy rights 
and the homeland security objectives of fusion centers. Directors of fusion centers will 
find this thesis useful in designing policies and procedures to address privacy concerns. 
Moreover, the thesis will contribute to the body of literature addressing fusion centers by 




1. Policy Analysis 
In order to properly assess the privacy guidelines and possible alternatives, it is 
best to begin with a comprehensive review of those guidelines currently in place in order 
to identify the strengths and weaknesses of those policies and to evaluate possible 
solutions that emphasize the strengths and eradicate the weaknesses. The research method 
best suited for such an endeavor is a policy analysis.  By thoroughly examining the 
privacy policies of major fusion centers that participated in the Suspicious Activity 
Report Support and Implementation Project (Chicago, Los Angeles, and Miami-Dade), it 
will be possible to understand the strengths and weaknesses of these existing policies.1 
The Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Support and Implementation Project’s aim was to 
develop a uniform approach to the reporting of suspicious activity (SAR Support and 
Implementation Project [SAR], 2008). The aim of this thesis is similar in that it seeks to 
address a uniform method for fusion centers to protect privacy rights while facilitating 
the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information. For this reason, the privacy 
policies of those fusion centers involved in the project were selected for analysis. 
Furthermore, a more in-depth appraisal of this subject is afforded through a review of the 
aforementioned fusion centers’ privacy policies as to collection, retention, and 
dissemination of personal data, an examination of local, state, and federal legal 
requirements concerning privacy, and an assessment of the degree of transparency and 
openness of those policies and procedures to the public.  
In addition, an extensive evaluation of DOJ- and DHS-recommended privacy 
guidelines is required, as delineated in the Department of Homeland Security and 
Department of Justice’s Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information 
and Intelligence in a New Era (USDHS & DOJ, 2006), the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Policy Development Guide and Implementation Template (DOJ, 2008), and the Privacy 
Impact Assessment for the Department of Homeland Security State, Local, and Regional 
                                                 
1 The Boston Regional Information Center is in the process of reviewing its privacy policy; therefore, 
the policy is unavailable at this time. 
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Fusion Center Initiative (USDHS, 2008) . An analysis of these recommended guidelines, 
compared to policies actually implemented in the fusion centers, enables one to gauge the 
effectiveness of implementing a standard guideline across the nation. 
2. Policy Options Analysis 
a. Mandatory Guidelines 
The privacy guidelines recommended by the Department of Justice and the 
Department of Homeland Security are not mandatory. As a result, fusion centers utilize a 
variety of privacy guidelines. In order to ensure some consistency in the application of 
these guidelines, DHS offers training and technical assistance for fusion center 
participants. “Global [U.S. Department of Justice’s Global Justice Information Sharing 
Initiative] resources support development of common standards and protocols for 
collecting, analyzing, and sharing information (and associated training) and the creation 
of intelligence products for customers” (DOJ, 2009, p. 11). In order to further support 
such standardization, one solution proposes to require mandatory imposition of the DOJ 
and DHS guidelines. 
b. Balancing Test and Administrative Review 
Another possible solution is a fusion center policy requiring the imposition 
of a balancing test coupled with an administrative review process prior to the collection 
and maintenance of personal information.  The balancing test would be utilized in 
conjunction with the DHS and DOJ guidelines in order to ascertain, given a particular set 
of circumstances, to what extent privacy rights should be compromised. In other words, 
does the need to prevent terrorism, crime, or other hazards by collecting, maintaining, or 
disseminating particular information outweigh the public’s right to privacy? 
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c. Reasonable Suspicion Requirement 
Under the final proposed policy, collection, retention, and dissemination 
of information by all fusion centers would only be permitted if reasonable suspicion 
exists that the individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a criminal 
act. This is the current policy of Chicago’s fusion center. By imposing this recognizable 
standard upon all fusion centers, uniform application of DOJ- and DHS-recommended 
privacy guidelines may emerge. 
d. Analysis Criteria 
In deciding which policy to recommend, it is best to judge the proposed 
courses of action by their impact upon the following areas: consistency and coherence of 
governance structures and transparency. Both variables are equally important to the 
protection of the public’s right to privacy. The recommended policy must be simple to 
apply and provide a consistent method for the protection of privacy rights.  Furthermore, 
the recommended policy must afford a coherent view of the fusion center’s governance 
structures in order to ensure that, should fusion centers fail to adhere to privacy policies, 
the public is alerted as to what corrective action it should take.  
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Although fusion centers differ as to whether they adopt an all-hazards, crime-
oriented, or anti-terrorism focus, the centers display similarities as to the functions 
performed at these facilities. The publications acknowledge that the collection of 
intelligence and the use of private-sector data cause concern about privacy rights. 
Because of these concerns, many government publications delineate guidelines for the 
collection of intelligence and the use of data in order to achieve the fusion center’s goals 
while simultaneously protecting citizens’ right to privacy. Nongovernmental publications 




guidelines. In reviewing the literature, the publications discuss two primary areas of the 
intelligence process: risks and activities associated with the intelligence process and core 
principles of privacy. 
1. Risk and Activities 
The Privacy and Civil Liberties Implementation Guide for the Information 
Sharing Environment identifies six activities relating to information sharing (collection, 
retention, production, usage, sharing, and management) that impact privacy (Information 
Sharing Environment [ISE], 2008). Federal agencies in the intelligence community 
regularly conduct these activities, and state and regional fusion centers participate in such 
activities as well. 
Most of the publications tend to identify specific risks to privacy. For example, 
the Department of Homeland Security’s Privacy Impact Assessment identifies seven such 
risks: justification for fusion centers, ambiguous lines of authority, participation of the 
military and private sector, data mining, excessive secrecy, inaccurate or incomplete 
information, and mission creep (USDHS, 2008). Even nongovernmental agencies identify 
these same risks. In “What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers?” the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) discussed each of the risks identified by DHS’s Privacy Impact 
Assessment (German & Stanley, 2007). Where publications tend to differ is in their 
proposed solutions to mitigating these risks.  
2. Principles 
Some documents address core principles for federal agencies in the intelligence 
community. Though these documents do not apply per se to state and regional fusion 
centers, the core principles may be applied to such systems. For example, the Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Implementation Guide for the Information Sharing Environment points 
out that “in order to share information in the ISE, nonfederal entities – including state, 
local, tribal, and foreign governments—develop and implement appropriate policies and 
procedures that provide protections that are at least as comprehensive as those contained 
in the ISE Privacy Guidelines” (ISE, 2008, p.2). In order to be effective, fusion centers 
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must be able to share information within the information-sharing environment, with the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), for example.  
Specific privacy principles applicable to fusion centers can be found in guideline 
8 in the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice’s Fusion Center 
Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era . 
According to the guideline, fusion centers should “develop, publish, and adhere to a 
privacy and civil liberties policy” (USDHS & DOJ, 2006, p. 41). Guideline 8 espouses 
eight core principles regarding privacy and civil liberties: collection limitation, data 
quality, purpose specification, use limitation, security safeguards, openness, individual 
participation, and accountability. These principles tie directly to the activities of a fusion 
center, i.e., those delineated in the ISE Privacy Guidelines. 
Underlying core privacy principles are also identified by nongovernmental 
organizations, such as the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), for example. In 
2007, Lillie Coney delivered a statement on behalf of the organization to the Department 
of Homeland Security’s Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee. According to 
Coney (2007), the Privacy Act of 1974, Public Law 93-579, identifies four procedural 
and substantive rights applicable to computerized databases in use by fusion centers: 1) 
requiring agencies to reveal information concerning an individual upon his request, 2) 
compelling agencies to adhere to fair information practices, 3) placing restrictions upon 
agencies as to information sharing, and 4) granting citizens the right to sue agencies for 
violations. 
3. Gaps in Literature 
a. Community Policing and Fusion Centers 
Fusion centers operate on a theory of expansive collaboration. The entities 
that participate in fusion centers vary, but most can be categorized as governmental or 
private sector. Among the governmental agencies, law enforcement (local or state) tends 
to lead the centers. Over the years, law enforcement has engaged in community policing 
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as a proactive strategy to address crime and disorder. The cornerstone of this strategy 
requires the consistent sharing of information and discussions with the community as to 
problems and solutions to address crime and disorder problems. Local law enforcement’s 
participation in fusion centers presents these agencies with a dilemma. Federal partners, 
such as the FBI and DEA, have not been engaged with the public to the same degree as 
local law enforcement. The openness and sharing of information with the public that is 
essential to effective community policing efforts is stymied when it comes to fusion 
center activities. In large part, this is due to the other participants who are apprehensive 
about such openness. The use of memorandums of understanding (MOUs) between 
federal agencies and local law enforcement has been identified by some of the literature 
as a collaborative tool. But, according to some such as EPIC, these agreements permit 
local agencies to circumvent state law as to freedom-of-information requests. 
Upon review of the guidelines issued by federal agencies such as DHS and 
DOJ, these documents fail to address the reconciliation of community-policing principles 
with fusion center operations. Rollins’s Congressional Research Service Report 
recommends public outreach (Rollins, 2008). However, community policing involves 
more than public outreach. It permits citizens to actively identify and prioritize items of 
concern to be addressed by the community and law enforcement. This level of 
involvement does not appear to be present in fusion center operations, nor is it addressed 
in a review of the various government publications. 
Another area of contention that appears to be ignored by the guidelines is 
the customers of the fusion centers. Repeatedly, the various guidelines identify customers 
as the participant agencies of the fusion centers. Law enforcement, however, has defined 
its customers as the public it serves. The guidelines are virtually silent as to these 
competing definitions. The public is concerned with transparency. The participating 
agencies are concerned with security. Transparency of fusion center operations and 
public involvement directly affects an agency’s ability to gather information. The failure 
of guidelines to adequately address the competing principles of security and transparency 
results in inconsistencies among fusion centers. 
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b. Agency-Initiated Privacy Impact Assessments 
There exists no shortage of federal guidelines on the subject of privacy. 
DHS and DOJ’s Fusion Center Guidelines (2006), DOJ’s Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Policy Development Guide and Implementation Template (2008), and DHS’s Privacy 
Impact Assessment for the Department of Homeland Security State, Local, and Regional 
Fusion Center Initiative (2008) serve as examples. The guidelines call upon the fusion 
centers to conduct their own privacy impact assessment (PIA).  In April of 2009, Director 
Robert Riegle of DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis testified before a committee 
examining the future of fusion centers, stating: “The DHS Privacy Office recommends 
that each fusion center conduct a PIA evaluating its own operations, make it available to 
the public, and then engage with its local communities.” (Riegle, 2009). Neither Riegle, 
nor the guidelines recommending such self-conducted privacy-impact assessments, 
address the inherent problem with an agency conducting its own assessments, i.e., lack of 
impartiality. Furthermore, each state and local agency is responsible for ensuring 
adherence to its own laws and policies, including those affecting privacy. A citizen’s 
right of redress is then mostly dependent upon individual fusion-center policies and state 
and local laws. 
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II. THE STATUS QUO 
A. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVACY 
1. Evolution of Fusion Centers 
Although state and local law enforcement agencies collected and analyzed 
information before September 11, 2001, the events of that day spurred these agencies to 
establish a more formal network to perform these tasks (Rollins, 2008). After 9/11, there 
were approximately 40 fusion centers (Rollins, 2008). Presently there exist 72 fusion 
centers. Primarily, state and local law enforcement agencies operate fusion centers. 
Federal agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and DHS participate in the 
centers, but are not responsible for the centers’ operations.  
As an example, the Chicago Police Department operates a fusion center called the 
Crime Prevention and Information Center (CPIC). The Chicago Police Department 
identifies the FBI, DHS, Department of Defense, Immigration Customs Enforcement, 
Illinois State Police, Cook County Sheriff’s Police, and the United States Coast Guard as 
dedicated partners. Federal transportation agencies and private security firms are 
identified as provisional partners (Chicago Police Department, 2007). Dedicated partners 
maintain a continuous presence at the CPIC. Provisional partners are utilized on a case-
by-case basis, in particular during an emergency management incident. 
Federal agencies may be partners in fusion centers with state, local, and tribal 
agencies, but the primary role of the federal government is to provide financial assistance 
through the grant system (Rollins, 2008). In addition, the federal government provides 
guidance and training to these entities. 
a. The General Mission of Fusion Centers 
Fusion centers primarily collect, analyze, and disseminate information. 
Some fusion centers concentrate on criminal and terrorist incidents. Others operate on an 
all-hazards basis. In 2006, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. 
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Department of Justice published Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing 
Information and Intelligence in a New Era. The document identifies 18 guidelines for 
fusion centers: 
1. Adhere to the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan 
(NCISP) and other sector-specific information sharing guidelines, and 
perform all steps of the intelligence and fusion process. 
2. Develop and embrace a mission statement and identify goals for 
the fusion center. 
3. Create a representative governance structure that includes law 
enforcement, public safety, and the private sector. 
4. Create a collaborative environment for the sharing of intelligence 
and information among local, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement 
agencies, public safety, and the private sector. 
5. Utilize memorandums of understanding (MOUs), non-disclosure 
agreements (NDAs), or other types of agency agreements, as appropriate. 
6. Leverage the databases, systems, and networks available via 
participating entities to maximize information sharing. 
7. Create an environment in which participants seamlessly 
communicate by leveraging existing systems and those currently under 
development, and allow for future connectivity to other local, state, tribal, 
and federal systems. 
8. Develop, publish, and adhere to a privacy and civil liberties policy. 
9. Ensure the appropriate security measures are in place for the 
facility, data, and personnel. 
10. Integrate technology, systems, and people. 
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11. Achieve a diversified representation of personnel based on the 
needs and functions of the center. 
12. Ensure personnel are properly trained. 
13. Provide a multitiered awareness and educational program to 
implement intelligence-led policing and developing and sharing 
information. 
14. Offer a variety of intelligence services and products to customers. 
15. Develop, publish, and adhere to a policies and procedures manual. 
16. Define expectations, measure performance, and determine 
effectiveness. 
17. Establish and maintain the center based on funding availability and 
sustainability. 
18. Develop and implement a communication plan within the fusion 
center; among all involved law enforcement, public safety, and private 
sector agencies and entities; and with the general public. (USDHS & DOJ, 
2006, pp. 5–7) 
b. Undertaking Domestic Intelligence Activities 
This thesis focuses on the 8h guideline: the development and 
implementation of a privacy policy. DHS and DOJ recommend adherence to the fair 
information practices delineated in the Privacy Policy Development Guide and the 
Privacy and Civil Rights Policy Template for Justice Information Systems as a means to 
safeguard privacy (USDHS & DOJ, 2006). These documents were developed by the U.S. 
Department of Justice’s Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative. According to the 
Global Initiative (2006), the fair information practices comprise the following eight 
principles: (1) collection limitation; (2) data quality; (3) purpose specification; (4) use 
limitation; (5) security safeguards; (6) openness; (7) individual participation; and (8) 
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accountability. Adherence to the aforementioned principles, according to DHS and DOJ 
(2006), ensures baseline privacy protection. However, an examination of these principles 
illustrates their lack of specificity. 
The Department of Homeland Security and DOJ (2006) recommend that 
the collection of personal data be limited to legal and fair methods. Also, if appropriate, 
fusion centers should collect the data with the subject’s knowledge or approval. The 
collection limitation principle fails to delineate the criteria for determining legal and fair 
means of data collection. 
The second principle addresses data quality. DHS and DOJ insist that the 
collected data be relevant to its proposed purpose and be accurate and complete. The data 
quality principle as explained in Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing 
Information and Intelligence in a New Era fails to specify legitimate (or illegitimate) 
purposes for data collection (USDHS & DOJ, 2006). Neither does the document offer a 
method for determining legitimacy. 
Likewise, the purpose specification principle also fails to specify 
legitimate purposes for data collection. It does, however, recommend that such purposes 
be determined at the time the data is collected (USDHS & DOJ, 2006). 
The fourth principle of fair information practices restricts usage or 
dissemination of the information in accordance with the fusion center’s governance 
structure, the subject’s consent, or by authority of law (USDHS & DOJ, 2006). 
Nevertheless, DHS and DOJ offer no further explanation. 
Similarly, the fifth principle recommends that personal information be 
protected by “reasonable” safeguards. However, it fails to explain how to determine that 
a safeguard is reasonable (USDHS & DOJ, 2006). 
As to transparency DHS and DOJ state, “There should be a general policy 
of openness about developments, practices, and policies with respect to personal data. 




data, and the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and usual residence of the 
data controller” (USDHS & DOJ, 2006, p. 41). DHS and DOJ fail to recommend how 
fusion centers should develop such practices and policies. 
The seventh principle recommended in Fusion Center Guidelines: 
Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era is individual 
participation. This principle encompasses a great degree of specificity. DHS and DOJ 
contend that an individual has the right to ascertain from the fusion center whether the 
center maintains data relating to the individual. Furthermore, DHS and DOJ recommend 
that the fusion center provide the individual with the requested data “within a reasonable 
time, cost, and manner” (USDHS & DOJ, 2006, p. 41). Moreover, the agencies state that 
if a request for information is denied, a mechanism must be in place to challenge such a 
denial. In addition, if the individual successfully challenges the content of the data, the 
information should be deleted, corrected, or completed (USDHS & DOJ, 2006). 
The final principle espoused by DHS and DOJ as to guideline 8 is 
accountability. Here, DHS and DOJ defer to the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing 
Plan (NCISP): 
• Eliminate unnecessary discretion in decision making, guide 
the necessary discretion, and continually audit the process 
to ensure conformance with the policy. 
• Ensure legitimacy—when an agency is developing a new 
policy or reviewing existing ones, interested parties and 
competing viewpoints should be represented. 
• Clearly define the parameters of the policy. 
• Acknowledge and address important issues that currently 
are not included in some existing criminal intelligence 
policies. 
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• Identify the decision points within the intelligence process 
and provide appropriate guidance and structure for each. 
(USDHS & DOJ, 2006) 
As with the previous principles, the recommended steps regarding 
accountability fail to offer any specificity. No suggestions or recommendations exist as to 
how a fusion center should go about performing the delineated general tasks. 
In 2008, the United States Information Sharing Environment (ISE) 
published the Privacy and Civil Liberties Implementation Guide for the Information 
Sharing Environment. This guide offers specificity; however, the document is directed 
toward federal agencies. It addresses issues likely to arise at the federal level, but not the 
state, local, or tribal level. According to this document there exist the two stages of 
implementation: identification and demonstration of the privacy policy’s framework and 
application of the privacy policy’s framework (ISE, 2008). 
2. Privacy Concerns and Considerations 
An examination of federal court cases and statutes establishes the fundamental 
principles of the citizen’s right to privacy. Adherence to these principles is required in the 
adoption of any recommended fusion-center policies. These policies are designed to 
balance privacy rights while simultaneously permitting fusion centers to effectively 
collect, analyze, and disseminate information. The cases and statutes below address the 
principle of “reasonableness” and its application to privacy rights. 
a. Case Law 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states: “The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 




place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” (United States Constitution, 
art. 4). Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has addressed an individual’s 
right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment. 
Several landmark court cases address privacy. Griswold v. Connecticut 
(1965) is thought to be the case in which the U.S. Supreme Court established the right to 
privacy (Lane, 2009).Connecticut law made it a crime to dispense contraceptive 
information, even to married persons. The court held the law unconstitutional. Justice 
Douglas stated in the court’s opinion: “We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill 
of Rights—older than our political parties, older than our school system” (Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).  
In Katz v. United States (1967), Katz appealed his conviction of interstate 
gambling based upon information that the FBI had obtained from warrantless electronic 
surveillance of his telephone conversation inside a public phone booth. Katz asserted that 
the FBI violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Supreme 
court agreed. “Writing for the court’s majority, associate justice Porter Stewart identified 
a zone of privacy that surrounds each individual: ‘Wherever a man may be,’ he said, ‘he 
is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizure’ ” 
(Lane, 2009, p. xiv). Katz had a reasonable expectation of privacy as to his conversation 
inside the phone booth even though the booth was visible to the public. 
In United States v. United States District Court (1972), the Attorney 
General of the United States approved electronic, domestic surveillance on the ground of 
national security. The government claimed that this approval was sufficient and no 
warrant was required. The court disagreed and stated: 
Official surveillance, whether its purpose be criminal investigation or 
ongoing intelligence gathering, risks infringement of constitutionally 
protected privacy of speech. Security surveillances are especially sensitive 
because of the inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept, the 
necessarily broad and continuing nature of intelligence gathering, and the 
temptation to utilize such surveillances to oversee political dissent. We 
recognize, as we have before, the constitutional basis of the President’s 
domestic security role, but we think it must be exercised in a manner  
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compatible with the Fourth Amendment. In this case we hold that this 
requires an appropriate prior warrant procedure. (United States v. United 
States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 320, (1972)). 
In U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court found that 
no reasonable expectation of privacy existed as to bank records, thereby permitting the 
records to be obtained via subpoena. Likewise, in 1979, the court held in Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, that no warrant was needed to obtain telephone numbers, via 
pen register, called by a subject. No reasonable expectation of privacy existed for these 
numbers as the numbers were included in the subject’s telephone bill. 
In Whelan v. Roe, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the 1972 New York 
State Controlled Substances Act, which required the state to collect names and addresses 
of persons who obtained controlled substances via a physician’s prescription. This 
information was maintained in a computer file. The court rejected the claim that 
collection and maintenance of this information constituted an invasion of a patient’s 
privacy (Whelan v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)). 
In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed whether FBI criminal 
identification records (“rap sheets”) constituted personal information that could be 
exempted from disclosure to a third party under the Freedom of Information Act. The 
court stated: “The privacy interest in a rap sheet is substantial. The substantial character 
of that interest is affected by the fact that in today’s society the computer can accumulate 
and store information that would otherwise have surely been forgotten long before a 
person attains age 80, when the FBI’s rap sheets are discarded” (U.S. Department of 
Justice v. Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. 749, 771 (1989)). 
Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court decided City of Ontario v. Quon 
560 U.S. ___ (2010). In this case, the police officer Quon asserted that he had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy to his text messages transmitted over his employer’s 
(Ontario, California Police Department) communication device. Furthermore, he 
contended that his employer’s seizure of these communications without a warrant 
violated the Fourth Amendment.  
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The court agreed that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy. It 
relied on Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613–614 (1989) in 
stating that “the Amendment guarantees the privacy, dignity, and security of persons 
against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the government, without regard 
to whether the government actor is investigating crime or performing another function.” 
Nevertheless, the court held that the Ontario Police Department’s retrieval of the text 
messages without a warrant constituted a reasonable search and seizure. 
In summary, the U.S. Supreme Court has established in a number of cases throughout the 
years that individuals have a right to privacy pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. 
Furthermore, when people have a reasonable expectation of privacy, government must 
have a warrant or exceptional reasons for invading the person’s privacy. However, where 
no reasonable expectation of privacy exists, the government need not obtain a warrant. 
b. Federal Statutes 
The Privacy Act of 1974 (5 USC § 552a) applies only to federal agencies, 
but it serves as a foundation from which other statutes arose. The Privacy Act of 1974 
governs the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of personal information by 
federal agencies. Absent statutory exemptions, the act prohibits dissemination of 
information without the subject’s consent. Some exemptions include information 
collected and disseminated for statistical purposes, criminal investigations, and routine 
use. In reality, “the Privacy Act requires each agency in possession of systems of records 
to publish for each system the routine uses to which the information might be put. Such 
notices are published in the Federal Register. Most citizens are unaware of these notices 
and their implications, with the result that they have little understanding of how 
information supplied by or about them to the government agencies might be used” 
(Relyea, 2002, p. 9). Nevertheless, individuals may review, request copies, or request 
correction of their records under the Privacy Act. 
In 2008, the General Accounting Office (GAO) submitted a report 
identifying three key problems with the Privacy Act: 1) narrowly defined key terms, 2)  
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no assurance that usage of personal information is restricted to clearly defined purposes, 
and 3) no effective means of communication to the public. The office did, however, 
recommend several actions be taken to correct these problems: 
• Revising the scope of the laws to cover all personally 
identifiable information collected, used, and maintained by 
the federal government; 
• Setting requirements to ensure that the collection and use of 
personally identifiable information is limited to a stated 
purpose; and 
• Establishing additional mechanisms for informing the 
public about privacy protections by revising requirements 
for the structure and publication of public notices. (GAO, 
2008) 
Section 208 of the E-Government Act of 2002 (44 U.S.C. § 208) requires 
federal agencies to conduct privacy impact assessments when utilizing new or 
substantially altered systems handling personal information (Privacy Office, 2007). “A 
PIA should accomplish two goals: (1) it should determine the risks and effects of 
collecting, maintaining, and disseminating personally identifiable information via an 
electronic system; and (2) it should evaluate protections and alternative processes for 
handling information to mitigate potential privacy risks” (Privacy Office, 2007, p. 7). 
Although the Privacy Act of 1974 and the E-Government Act of 2002 
apply to federal agencies, neither applies to state and local agencies managing fusion 
centers. However, the Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies (28 CFR Part 23) 
apply to federal agencies and nonfederal agencies who receive federal funds for their 
intelligence systems. Fusion centers receive federal monies in order to operate their 
intelligence systems. Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations states: “A project shall 




there is reasonable suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal conduct or 
activity and the information is relevant to that criminal conduct or activity” (28 CFR 
§ 23.20 (a)). 
The Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies place the 
responsibility upon those operating the system to establish reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity through information obtained from a participating agency or to a trained 
agency subject to inspection and audit (28 CFR § 23.20 (c)). The regulations also address 
the proper dissemination of information. “A project or authorized recipient shall 
disseminate criminal intelligence information only where there is a need to know and a 
right to know the information in the performance of a law enforcement activity” (28 CFR 
§ 23.20 (e)). 
The Privacy Act of 1974, the E-Government Act of 2002, and Title 28 
Part 23 of the Code of Federal Regulations each address the manner in which information 
should be collected, maintained, and disseminated by government agencies. Adherence 
by fusion centers to the principles contained in these legislative acts aids in the protection 
of privacy rights—rights that have been well established in various U.S. Supreme Court 
cases throughout the years. This thesis proposes a decision-making model that melds 
privacy principles established by case law and the federal statutes. Fusion-center 
operators employing such a model would ensure consistency and coherency in 
implementing fusion-center guidelines established by DHS and DOJ. 
B. CASE STUDIES 
The table below illustrates a comparison between the privacy policies of the 
Chicago Police Department (CPD), California’s State Terrorism Threat Assessment 






Table 1.   Privacy Policies Comparison 
 Chicago CPIC California STTAS Miami-Dade HSB 
Privacy 
Principles 
X X X 
Mission 
Statement 
 X X 
Reasonable 
Suspicion 
X X X 
MOUs X X X 
Training  X X 
Privacy Officer  X  
Info Retention   X  
Complaints  X  
1. Chicago Fusion Center Privacy Policy 
A copy of Chicago’s Crime Prevention and Information Center privacy policy can 
be found in Appendix A. As illustrated in Table 1, the policy addresses each of the eight 
fair information principles: (1) collection limitation; (2) data quality; (3) purpose 
specification; (4) use limitation; (5) security safeguards; (6) openness; (7) individual 
participation; and (8) accountability, as recommended in the Fusion Center Guidelines 
(USDHS & DOJ, 2006). However, the policy does not include a specific mission 
statement, a specific section on training, or the designation of a privacy officer. 
Nevertheless, the policy does specify that participants in the center sign on to a 
memorandum of understanding to abide by the policy. Moreover, “information obtained 
from or through the CPIC can only be used for lawful purposes. A lawful purpose means 
the request for data can be directly linked to a law enforcement agency’s active criminal 
investigation or is a response to a confirmed lead that requires follow-up to prevent a 
criminal act” (Chicago Police Department, 2009, p. 2). This amounts to a requirement of 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
2. California’s Fusion Center Privacy Policy 
California requires adherence to its State Terrorism Threat Assessment System 
Information Privacy Policy by each fusion center operating in California, including that 
in Los Angeles. A copy of this privacy policy is given in Appendix B. California’s policy 
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is the most comprehensive. In addition to addressing the eight privacy principles, it 
includes a mission statement, detailed training requirements, designation of a privacy 
officer, and detailed instructions as to retention of information and complaints. 
Suspicious Activity Report information is particularly addressed: 
All SAR information will be reviewed for retention annually. At the end 
of one year, SAR information must be either purged or converted into 
criminal intelligence files, if the information satisfies the requirements for 
submission into criminal intelligence files. SAR information may be 
retained if, at a minimum, all personally identifiable information (or 
privacy field information) is removed and purged. (California, 2009, p. 17) 
3. Miami-Dade Fusion Center Privacy Policy 
The Miami-Dade Police Department operates the Homeland Security Bureau 
fusion center. A copy of its privacy policy can be found in Appendix C. Like Chicago 
and California, Miami-Dade includes the eight fair information principles. Furthermore, 
like California it specifically includes a detailed mission statement. However, it does not 
specifically cite a privacy officer, retention of information, or a complaint procedure. 
4. Comprehensive Policy Model 
Although all three policies specifically address the fair information principles, the 
California STTAS privacy policy is the most comprehensive of the three. Its policy 
covers the following fusion centers throughout California: 1) the Los Angeles Joint 
Regional Intelligence Center, 2) the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center, 3) 
the California State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center, 4) the Central California 
Intelligence Center, and 5) the San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center. The 
development of one policy for five centers resulted in the comprehensive privacy policy 
needed to address the concerns of multiple centers. Some of these concerns, such as 
information retention and complaints, are not addressed in the Chicago and Miami-Dade 
policies. The California model ensures consistency and coherence of fusion-center 
operations in regard to privacy and demonstrates how one policy can be utilized by 
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multiple centers. Similarly, a comprehensive policy designed to address privacy concerns 
at all fusion centers is possible. This thesis proposes such a policy. 
C. GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND TRANSPARENCY ISSUES 
The concerns of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center illustrate the concerns that many citizens have regarding 
fusion centers. These concerns relate primarily to complex governance structures and a 
lack of transparency. Recommended policies must adequately address these concerns in 
order to protect privacy rights while facilitating fusion-center operations. 
1. American Civil Liberties Union Concerns 
In 2007, the American Civil Liberties Union released a report entitled, “What’s 
Wrong with Fusion Centers?” The report, prepared by Michael German and Jay Stanley 
(2007), identified five areas of concern: 
• Ambiguous lines of authority; 
• Private sector participation; 
• Military participation; 
• Data mining; 
• Excessive secrecy. 
These areas of concern address issues of governance structures and transparency. 
According to the ACLU, the participation by multiple agencies in fusion centers permits 
agencies to avoid adherence to their own policies by requesting another participating 
agency to take action that is prohibited to them. This results in policy shopping (German 
& Stanley, 2007). Responsibilities are not clearly delineated. As such, the public is 
unsure to whom questions or matters of redress should be directed. Lines of authority are 
obscured. 
Another area of concern for the ACLU arises from the participation of private, 
nongovernmental agencies in fusion centers. According to German and Stanley (2007), 
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such participation jeopardizes citizens’ privacy. Nongovernmental agencies may be privy 
to the personal information of citizens—information to which they would not have access 
without participation in a fusion center. In addition, according to the ACLU, private 
agency participation presents an opportunity for government actors to hide illegal or 
questionable actions by requesting private agencies to perform activities that government 
agencies would be prohibited from performing. Also at issue is the delineation of 
responsibilities to these private agencies. Their place in the governance structure of a 
fusion center remains ambiguous at best. 
A third area of concern identified by German and Stanley is military involvement 
in fusion centers. The National Guard participates in a number of fusion center 
operations. The ACLU acknowledges its fear that military participation enhances the 
probability that “officials who regard American communities as battlegrounds in a ‘war’ 
can be tempted to dispense with ‘inconvenient’ checks and balances” (German & 
Stanley, 2007, p. 15). 
The ACLU maintains that data fusion is the equivalent of data mining (German & 
Stanley, 2007). Moreover, the agency contends that the DOJ guidelines for fusion center 
operations encourage data mining (German & Stanley, 2007). The agency’s report, 
“What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers?” states that the following will result from the data-
mining activities of fusion centers: 
Many innocent individuals will be flagged, scrutinized, investigated, 
placed on watch lists, interrogated or arrested, and possibly suffer 
irreparable harm to their reputation, all because of a hidden machinery of 
data brokers, information aggregators and computer algorithms. 
Law enforcement agencies will waste time and resources investing in 
high-tech computer boondoggles that leave them chasing false leads—
while real threats go unaddressed and limited resources are sucked away 
from the basic, old-fashioned legwork that is the only way genuine terror 
plots have ever been foiled. (German & Stanley, 2007, p. 15) 
The final area of concern for the ACLU is their claim of excessive secrecy 
practiced by fusion centers. German and Stanley (2007) contend that such a practice 
prevents those injured by fusion centers to adequately seek redress. Furthermore, it 
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impedes the very mission of the fusion center—to prevent terrorism via information 
sharing. According to the ACLU, over-classification of documents and other materials is 
the unfortunate result of such excessive secrecy. The 9/11 Commission acknowledged the 
need for a new information-sharing system. “A decentralized network model, the concept 
behind much of the information revolution, shares data horizontally too. Agencies would 
still have their own databases, but those databases would be searchable across agency 
lines. In this system, secrets are protected through the design of the network and an 
‘information rights management’ approach that controls access to the data, not access to 
the whole network” (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 418). 
In 2008, German and Stanley released an update to “What’s Wrong with Fusion 
Centers?” entitled “Fusion Center Update.” This update claimed that recent events had 
confirmed their worst fears as identified in the initial report. Law enforcement agencies 
monitored everyday, noncriminal behavior. Police officers were operating as national 
domestic intelligence agents. Fusion centers substantially increased data collection 
efforts. According to the ACLU, the population was moving swiftly toward a total 
surveillance society (German & Stanley, 2008). 
According to German and Stanley, the Los Angeles Police Department issued a 
department directive requiring officers to report 65 behaviors, including “innocuous, 
clearly subjective, and First Amendment protected activities” (2008, p. 2). The collection 
of noncriminal information violates 28 CFR, Part 23 according to the ACLU (German & 
Stanley, 2008).  
Another aspect that the ACLU warned against was the expansion of data-
collection activities by fusion centers. According to German and Stanley, “The 
Washington Post reported in April of 2008 that fusion centers have increasing access to 
Americans’ private information through an array of databases. In addition to access to 
FBI and even CIA records, fusion centers often have subscriptions with private data 
brokers such as Accurint, Choice Point, Lexis-Nexus, and LocatePlus, a database 
containing cellphone numbers and unpublished telephone records” (German & Stanley, 
2008, p. 3). The ACLU update report also cites examples in Pennsylvania and 
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Massachusetts, in which these state fusion centers bought credit reports and insurance-
claim information ,respectively (German & Stanley, 2008). 
Lastly, another area of concern identified by the ACLU is the use of fusion 
centers to collect information concerning peace activists and political dissenters (German 
& Stanley, 2008). According to the ACLU update report, the Maryland State Police 
monitored the activities of a well-known peace activist and shared his identifying 
information with a number of different agencies. The information was subsequently 
loaded into a database accessible to Maryland's fusion center–—the Maryland 
Coordination and Analysis Center. According to German and Stanley, the 
aforementioned incident is a prime example of “mission creep” by fusion centers, i.e., 
altering their focus from terrorism to political activities (2008). 
2. Electronic Privacy Information Center Concerns 
In September of 2007, Lillie Coney, the Associate Director of the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center (EPIC), appeared before the Data Privacy and Integrity 
Advisory Committee of the Department of Homeland Security. Coney expressed EPIC’s 
concerns about fusion centers. In particular, Coney noted that “EPIC concluded that 
intelligence fusion center development and implementation is unfocused and undirected. 
The appropriate supervision, guidance and oversight necessary to assure privacy, civil 
liberty, and civil rights protection are imperative. Information fusion centers present 
grave threats to privacy and civil liberties” (Coney, 2007, p. 9). 
Coney made six recommendations affecting the operation of fusion centers: 
• DHS should identify the location, jurisdiction, and federal funding remitted 
to each fusion center; 
• Funding should be dependent upon a federal privacy impact analysis; 
• The Inspector General should investigate fusion centers’ compliance to due 
process, privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights laws; 
• Fusion centers should publicize the names of all its participants; 
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• Fusion centers should release annual reports concerning arrests, 
prosecutions, and convictions; 
• Fusion centers should comply with the provisions of the Privacy Act of 
1974 (5 USC § 552a) unless state statutes provide stronger protection, in 
which case, state statutes would apply. 
It should be noted that in December of 2009, DHS instituted a policy in which 
fusion centers are to submit their privacy policies for review in order to receive funding. 
“Under the DHS grant guidelines, fusion centers must certify that their privacy and civil 
liberties protections are as comprehensive as the ISE Guidelines within six months of the 
grant award. To make this certification, the fusion centers must have had their privacy 
policies reviewed and on file with the ISE Privacy Guidelines Committee” (Geiger, 
2009). However, once the grant award is made, no process is in place to halt funding if a 
fusion center violates its privacy policy. More than eighty percent of fusion centers have 
submitted privacy policies for review (ISE, 2010). 
3. Addressing ACLU and EPIC Concerns 
The primary objection to ACLU and EPIC concerns is that imposition of strict 
policies to prevent data mining and information sharing with private entities (or the 
military) and increase transparency hinders the ability of fusion centers to prevent 
terrorist or other criminal acts. The purpose of fusion centers is to facilitate information 
sharing among its participants, i.e., state, local, federal, or private partners. The premise 
is that, as a result of this information sharing, terrorist or other criminal incidents may be 
avoided. The proposed options examined by this thesis offer restrictions that satisfy the 
ACLU and EPIC concerns and promote consistency and coherence of fusion centers’ 
policies, while simultaneously permitting the facilitation of information sharing. 
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III. PROPOSED OPTIONS 
A. ESTABLISHING MANDATORY DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY PRIVACY GUIDELINES 
In order to address the governance and transparency issues identified by the 
ACLU and EPIC, several options are available. One such option is to require mandatory 
implementation of DOJ and DHS guidelines.  
1. Best Practices Utilizing DHS and DOJ Guidelines 
In State Fusion Center Processes and Procedures: Best Practices and 
Recommendations, Rollins and Connors provide 12 recommendations for improving the 
establishment, support, and operation of fusion centers.  As to the establishment of a 
fusion center, the authors recommend the development of a mission statement, strategies, 
policies and procedures, and a realistic budget spanning a number of years (Rollins & 
Connors, 2007). It is recommended that the various participants of the fusion center 
contribute to the development of these fundamentals. Moreover, the rules, 
responsibilities, and chain of command should be clearly delineated. Furthermore, 
“protection of privacy and civil liberties; the requirement as delineated in 28 CFR, part 
23 should be addressed specifically” (Rollins & Connors, 2007, p. 6). 
As to the supporting structure of a fusion center, Rollins and Connor recommend 
that two forms of governance structures be implemented: internal and external. The 
internal governance structure is comprised of entities that rely on the products and 
services of the fusion center. The external governance structure includes groups such as 
civil rights advocates. These members of governance committees ensure review and 
accountability. In addition to the internal and external governance structures, Rollins and 
Connors recommend the implementation of a staffing plan, memorandums of agreement, 
and education and training programs. Lastly, they recommend the use of templates, 
information-sharing policies and procedures, information technology structure, and 
security measures. 
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2. Federal Regulation Pros and Cons 
Imposing the best practices identified by Rollins and Connors (2007) has its 
benefits and drawbacks. As a benefit, standardized implementation of guidelines would 
increase the consistency among fusion-center operations. It would lessen the likelihood of 
“policy shopping” as identified by the ACLU. Moreover, mandatory guidelines would 
strengthen the coherence of fusion centers by the public. Fusion-center policies would be 
clearer and less confusing to the public because they would be less likely to differ from 
center to center. Because the guidelines would be mandatory, it would strengthen the 
ability of DHS to grant funding to those centers who met the guidelines. Such an 
arrangement would serve as a deterrent for fusion centers to violate citizens’ privacy. 
Violation of citizens’ privacy would amount to violation of the guidelines, which would 
result in no funding from DHS. 
As a drawback to mandatory implementation of guidelines, fusion centers would 
be less likely to be innovative in addressing hazards unique to their own regions for fear 
of losing DHS funding. One set of standards applied to the establishment, support, and 
operation of all fusion centers may not be appropriate in all circumstances. 
Implementation of mandatory guidelines may increase confusion and lead to less 
coherence where state laws differ from federal laws regarding privacy. The problem with 
“one size fits all” is that oftentimes one policy does not fit in all circumstances. Fusion 
centers may then be forced to implement a list of exceptions to policies that undermine 
the very principles the guidelines seek to uphold: 1) collection limitation; 2) data quality; 
3) purpose specification; 4) use limitation; 5) security safeguards; 6) openness; 7) 
individual participation; and 8) accountability (USDHS & DOJ, 2006). 
B. UTILIZING A BALANCING TEST AND ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW 
PROCESS 
Another available option to address the governance and transparency issues 
identified by the ACLU and EPIC is the use of a balancing test and administrative review 
process. The balancing test would encompass the elements of reasonable expectation of 
privacy identified in Katz and the exigent circumstances principle. 
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1. Elements of the Balancing Test 
Criminal law regularly utilizes balancing tests to assess law enforcement action. 
Two well known tenets of criminal law are the “reasonable expectation of privacy” and 
“exigent circumstances.” An analysis of those tenets would address the appropriateness 
of their application to fusion-center activities. The proposed balancing test would be 
comprised of two prongs: 1) assessment of the extent to which citizens possess the 
reasonable expectation of a right to privacy as to the information in question, and 2) 
existence of exigent circumstances requiring immediate action as to the information in 
order to prevent serious physical harm or death. In cases where no reasonable expectation 
of privacy exists, as explained in Katz, fusion centers could collect or disseminate the 
information. In cases where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, but exigent 
circumstances also exist that could result in imminent serious bodily harm or death, 
information could also be collected or disseminated. 
2. Administrative Review Process  
In cases wherein citizens possess a reasonable expectation of privacy and no 
exigent circumstances exist, an administrative review process would be required prior to 
the collection, maintenance, or dissemination of the information by a fusion center. An 
individual or committee higher in authority than the functional operators of the fusion 
center would decide whether the citizen’s right to privacy outweighed the fusion center’s 
need to collect, maintain, or disseminate the information. Because no exigent 
circumstances exist, time is available for a more in-depth review prior to taking one of 
the aforementioned actions. In the event that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists, 
review beyond the functional operators of the fusion center is not required. If a 
reasonable expectation of privacy and exigent circumstances exist, functional operators 
would also decide on the propriety of collecting, maintaining, or disseminating the 
information when little or no time is available for further review.  
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3. Pros and Cons of Balancing Test and Administrative Review 
Requiring a balancing test and administrative review would result in a more 
consistent and coherent application of the DHS and DOJ guidelines as all fusion centers 
would implement this policy. However, the speed by which information flowed would be 
impaired in those cases requiring an administrative review. As not all information is 
known, exigent circumstances could exist of which fusion center operators would not be 
aware. Administrative review would reduce the center’s ability to disseminate 
information in a timely manner, thereby causing the center to unknowingly exacerbate a 
dangerous situation. 
C.  IMPOSING A REASONABLE-SUSPICION REQUIREMENT 
The final option analyzed by this thesis is the reasonable-suspicion requirement. 
Such a requirement is quite familiar to law enforcement agencies as it plays an important 
role in their daily activities, i.e., stopping and searching individuals suspected of 
committing a crime. Application of the requirement to the collection, maintenance, and 
dissemination of information within the context of a fusion center, then, is very feasible. 
1. Definition of Reasonable Suspicion Under Criminal Law 
The reasonable suspicion requirement was established in Terry v. Ohio (1968). 
The United States Supreme Court stated that “it is necessary ‘first to focus upon the 
governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally 
protected interests of the private citizen,’ for there is ‘no ready test for determining 
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion 
which the search [or seizure] entails’… And in justifying the particular intrusion the 
police officer must be able to point to articulable facts which, taken together with rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion” (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
21–22 (1968)).  
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2. Application of Reasonable Suspicion Requirement to Fusion Centers 
The Code of Federal Regulations also requires that reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity exist prior to collecting, maintaining, or disseminating information. An 
operating agency must be able to articulate that the facts indicate rational inferences of a 
crime. According to 28 CFR § 23.20 (c), “Reasonable suspicion or Criminal Predicate is 
established when information exists which establishes sufficient facts to give a trained 
law enforcement or criminal investigative agency officer, investigator, or employee a 
basis to believe that there is a reasonable possibility that an individual or organization is 
involved in a definable criminal activity or enterprise.” 
3. Pros and Cons of a Reasonable Suspicion Requirement 
The imposition of a reasonable-suspicion requirement serves to protect citizens’ 
privacy by limiting the collection of their personal information by a law enforcement 
agency. Without a nexus to criminal activity, law enforcement is free to collect and store 
information without restraint. Such information could be utilized to chill the exercise of 
First Amendment activities by citizens. 
In addition, the reasonable-suspicion requirement does not necessitate an agency’s 
obtaining a warrant to collect information. While limiting law enforcement’s actions in 
some regard, the reasonable-suspicion requirement also facilitates its activities in the 
collection of information by satisfying the Fourth Amendment—not engaging in 
unreasonable searches and seizures—without going through the complicated process of 
obtaining a warrant. 
Though the reasonable-suspicion requirement helps to protect citizens’ privacy 
and satisfies the Fourth Amendment, the limitation of information tied to criminal 
activity serves to restrain law enforcement’s capabilities to “connect the dots.” Some 
information when viewed on its own appears innocuous but when viewed in relation to 
other information may be an indication of something more important. In addressing 
terrorism a fusion center’s ability to piece together various fragments of information may 
affect an agency’s capacity to prevent a terrorist incident. 
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IV. CHOOSING THE RIGHT POLICY 
In deciding which policy to recommend, it is best to judge the proposed courses 
of action by their impact on consistency and coherence of governance structures and 
transparency. Both variables are equally important to the protection of the public’s right 
to privacy. The recommended policy must be simple to apply and provide a consistent 
method for protection of privacy rights. Furthermore, the recommended policy must 
afford a coherent view of the fusion center’s governance structures (defined roles, 
delineated responsibilities, and accountability) in order to ensure that, should fusion 
centers fail to adhere to privacy policies, the public is alerted as to what corrective action 
it should take. In The Privacy Challenges of U.S. Fusion Centers, Andino (2008) 
identified several assessment areas as to transparency: openness, collection, use, 
individual participation, and accountability. Utilizing these assessment areas will provide 
a comprehensive analysis of the proposed policies. The matrix below provides a 
comparative analysis of the proposed options as to governance structure and 
transparency. The number “1” indicates little or no positive impact. The number “3” 
indicates medium positive impact. Lastly, the number “5” indicates high positive impact. 









Defined Roles 5 5 1 
Delineated 
Responsibilities 
5 5 1 
Accountability 5 5 1 
Openness 3 3 1 
Collection 5 5 5 
Use 5 5 5 
Individual 
Participation 
3 3 1 
* Governance encompasses defined roles, delineated responsibilities, and 




A. MANDATORY DOJ AND DHS GUIDELINES OPTION 
As indicated in the table above, the imposition of mandatory guidelines would 
highly impact governance structures. Mandatory rules and procedures require defined 
roles for participants with clearly delineated responsibilities for all. Moreover, 
participating persons and agencies may be held accountable for performing their 
responsibilities. 
On the other hand, mandatory guidelines have medium effect upon some aspects 
of transparency, i.e., openness and individual participation. Mandatory guidelines do, 
however, greatly impact the collection and use of information. The effect depends greatly 
upon instituting mandatory rules and procedures, making certain aspects of the fusion 
center transparent to the public, and enforcing these rules and procedures. Even with 
mandatory guidelines in place, fusion centers may allow agencies to utilize partnerships 
with other agencies to circumvent the guidelines. If the fusion center does not own the 
data, even though they view it and analyze it, the center does not comply with FOIA 
requests. 
B. BALANCING TEST AND ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW OPTION 
The balancing test and administrative review option, like the mandatory 
guidelines option, has a significant impact on the governance structures. The test is 
coherent in its application since law enforcement agencies are already familiar with 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy principles. Specific, higher approval by administrative 
review would be required for the collection and use of personal information in which a 
reasonable expectation of privacy existed and no exigent circumstances were evident in 
which serious bodily harm or death was imminent. However, this decision-making 
apparatus has medium impact on openness to the public and individual participation by 
the public. The decision-making tools (balancing test and administrative review) are all 
in-house, under the fusion center’s control. 
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C. REASONABLE-SUSPICION OPTION 
As indicated above, the reasonable-suspicion option has the highest degree of 
impact as to collection and use of data. As a decision-making tool, it aids fusion-center 
operators in choosing what information to collect and store using the center’s criminal 
intelligence systems, as required per 28 CFR, Part 23. However, the public remains in the 
dark about specifically what information is being collected and used by fusion centers. 
Furthermore, the reasonable-suspicion requirement fails to define roles, delineate 
responsibilities, or address accountability issues. However, like the balancing test option 
of analyzing the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy, law enforcement 
agencies are quite familiar with the principles of reasonable suspicion. Therefore, its 
application is coherent and can be consistently applied. 
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V.  THE RECOMMENDED POLICY 
This thesis recommends imposing all three of the aforementioned options: 
mandatory guidelines, a balancing test and administrative review, and a reasonable-
suspicion requirement. As illustrated by Table 2, each policy on its own is deficient in 
that it fails to adequately address each governance structure and transparency issue. 
However, a combination of the three accomplishes that task. 
A. MANDATORY FUSION CENTER GUIDELINES 
First, it is clear that guidelines alone without a requirement that they be imposed 
leads to inconsistency in application of the guidelines from fusion center to fusion center. 
Not all guidelines need to be mandatory. However, those that directly affect the privacy 
rights of citizens and, therefore, have constitutional implications, must be mandatory. The 
DHS has recognized this fact and required fusion centers to submit their privacy policies 
for review in order to receive DHS funding (Geiger, 2009). Therefore, it is recommended 
that the DOJ and DHS fusion center guidelines be mandatory. 
B. MANDATORY BALANCING TEST AND ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW 
POLICY 
Secondly, in order to further protect the personal information of citizens, it is 
recommended that fusion centers mandatorily utilize a balancing test and administrative 
review process when deciding to collect or disseminate information. The balancing test 
has two prongs: 1) ascertain whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists and 2) 
ascertain whether exigent circumstances exist in which serious bodily harm or death to 
person(s) is imminent. Administrative review of higher authority beyond that of fusion 
center operators and analysts would be required where a reasonable expectation of 
privacy existed and no exigent circumstances were evident. 
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C. MANDATORY REASONABLE SUSPICION REQUIREMENT 
Thirdly, it is recommended that all fusion centers collect and maintain 
information only if reasonable suspicion exists of criminal activity. The centers would 
not be able to circumvent 28 CFR Part 23 by failing to enter such information in criminal 
intelligence systems funded by federal grants. Nor would the centers be permitted to 
engage private sector (or public) partners to collect the information in the absence of a 
criminal investigation. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Fusion centers must balance citizens’ privacy rights with the need to collect, 
analyze, and disseminate information to prevent terrorism and other crimes. The DOJ and 
DHS issued a number of guidelines to aid in this endeavor. However, because the 
guidelines are not mandatory, fusion centers vary in privacy policies and procedures. 
The ACLU and EPIC identified a number of concerns relating to complex 
governance structures and lack of transparency. This thesis recommends the mandatory 
implementation of three policies in order to ensure consistency and coherence of 
operational structure and transparency in the implementation of policies by fusion 
centers; this will simultaneously guard against the abuse of privacy rights and facilitate 
the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information. Mandatory imposition of the 
DOJ and DHS fusion center guidelines, a balancing test and administrative-review 
process, and a reasonable-suspicion requirement would ensure coherent and consistent 
governance structures and transparency as to fusion centers, thereby striking the right 
balance between protecting citizens’ privacy rights and permitting fusion centers to 
collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence in the information-sharing era. 
The examination of federal cases and statutes establishes that privacy is a 
fundamental, constitutional right.  As such, all fusion centers should be required to 
impose the DOJ and DHS privacy guidelines in order to ensure uniform protection of this 
right. Furthermore, all fusion centers should restrict the collection of information to that 
related to criminal investigations established by the existence of reasonable suspicion of 
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criminal activity. Lastly, all fusion centers should ascertain whether a reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists when collecting or disseminating information. In the event 
that such an expectation exists and no exigent circumstances are present involving 
imminent death or serious physical injury to persons, administrative review of higher 
authority than the low- or mid-level operators of the fusion center would be required prior 
to the collection or dissemination of the information. However, where an expectation of 
privacy exists and exigent circumstances are present, low- or mid-level operators would 
unilaterally decide whether to collect or disseminate the information. Likewise, where no 
reasonable expectation of privacy is present, low- or mid-level fusion-center operators 
may collect or disseminate information as long as the reasonable suspicion requirement is 
met. 
There is little or no additional financial costs associated with the implementation 
of these recommendations. Due to fusion centers’ use of criminal intelligence systems 
and their dependence on federal funding, most fusion centers already require reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity in order to ensure compliance with 28 CFR Part 23. The use 
of a test balancing citizens’ reasonable expectations of privacy against the fusion center’s 
need to collect, analyze, and disseminate information and the use of an administrative 
review process also carry little or no additional costs as the structures are already in place 
via command-channel review in law enforcement agencies, which operate many of the 
fusion centers. 
As fusion centers’ policies become more standardized, more focus should then be 
placed upon the efficacy and efficiency of these policies and whether the centers facilitate 
information sharing to such a degree as to contribute significantly to the prevention of 
terrorism or other crimes. But for now, the imposition of mandatory policies and 
standards designed to protect citizens’ privacy should be the primary focus. 
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APPENDIX A.  CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT’S CRIME 
PREVENTION AND INFORMATION CENTER PRIVACY POLICY 
CRIME PREVENTION AND INFORMATION CENTER PRIVACY POLICY 
The Crime Prevention and Information Center is a Fusion Center (herein referenced 
to as “CPIC” as defined below: 
 
The CPIC project was initiated in response to the increase need for timely information 
sharing and exchange of crime-related information among members of the law 
enforcement community. One component of CPIC focuses on the development and 
exchange of criminal intelligence. This component focuses on the intelligence process 
where information is collected, integrated, evaluated, analyzed and disseminated. 
 
CPIC’s intelligence products and services will be made available to law enforcement 
agencies and other criminal justice entities. All agencies participating in the CPIC will be 
subject to a Memorandum of Understanding and will be required to adhere to all CPIC’s 
policies and security requirements. The purpose of this privacy policy is to ensure 
safeguards and sanctions are in place to protect personal information as information and 
intelligence are developed and exchanged. 
 
GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
CPIC’s Privacy Policy embraces the eight Privacy Design Principles which shall guide 
the policy and practices wherever applicable. The eight Privacy Design principles are: 
1. Purpose Specification – Define the CPIC’s purpose for information to 
help ensure the agency’s use of information is appropriate. 
2. Collection Limitation – Limit the collection of personal information to 
that required for the purposes intended. 
3. Data Quality – Ensure data accuracy. 
4. Use Limitation – Ensure appropriate limits on Department use of personal 
information. 
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5. Security safeguards – Maintain effective security over personal 
information. 
6. Openness – Maintains a citizen access to information available through 
the Freedom of Information Act. 
7. Individual Participation – Allow individual’s reasonable access and 
opportunity to correct errors in their personal information held by the 
Agency. 
8. Accountability – Identify, train and hold agency personnel accountable 
for adhering to agency information quality and privacy policies. 
 
I. Purpose Specification 
CPIC has developed databases by using existing data sources from federal, state and local 
law enforcement to integrate data with the goal of identifying, 
developing and analyzing intelligence related to violent crimes, terrorist activity 
and other crimes for investigative leads. This capability will facilitate integration 
and exchange of information between participating law enforcement agencies. 
 
II. Collection Limitation 
The CPIC is maintained for the purposes of developing information and 
intelligence by agencies who participate in the CPIC. The decision of an agency 
to participate in CPIC and about which databases to provide is voluntary. 
Information obtained and disseminated by a law enforcement agency outside of 
Chicago will be governed by the laws and rules governing the individual agencies 
respecting such data, as well as by applicable federal laws.. 
Because the laws, rules or policies governing information and intelligence that 
can be collected and released on private individuals will vary from agency to 
agency, limitations on the collection of data concerning individuals is the 
responsibility of the collector of the original source data. Therefore, each 
contributor of information is under different legal restraints and restrictions. Each 
agency has its own responsibility to abide by the collection limitations applicable 
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to it by reasons of law. Information contributed to the center should be that which 
has been collected in conformance with those limitations. 
 
III. Data Quality 
The agencies participating in the Crime Prevention and Information Center 
remain the owners of the data contributed and are, therefore, responsible for the 
quality and accuracy of the data accessed by the Center. Inaccurate personal 
information can have a damaging impact on the person concerned and on the 
integrity and functional value of the Center. In order to maintain the integrity of 
the center, any information obtained through the Center must be independently 
verified with the original source from which the data was extrapolated before any 
official action (e.g., warrant or arrest) is taken. User agencies and individual users are 
responsible for compliance with respect to use and further dissemination of such 
information and the purging and updating of the data. 
 
IV. Use Limitation 
Information obtained from or through the CPIC can only be used for lawful 
purposes. A lawful purpose means the request for data can be directly linked to a 
law enforcement agency’s active criminal investigation or is a response to a 
confirmed lead that requires follow-up to prevent a criminal act. 
The primary responsibility for the overall operation of the Crime Prevention and 
Information Center will be the Commander of the Deployment Operations Center 
of the Chicago Police Department. The Commander will enforce the Privacy 
Policy of the CPIC and take the necessary measures to make certain that access to the 
CPIC’s information and resources is secure and will prevent any unauthorized access or 
use. The Chicago Police Department reserves the right to restrict the qualifications and 
number of personnel who will be accessing CPIC and to suspend or withhold service to 
any individual violating this Privacy Policy. The Department, or persons acting on behalf 
of the Department, further reserves the right to conduct inspections concerning the proper 
use and security of the information received from the center. 
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Security for information derived from CPIC will be provided in accordance with 
all applicable federal, state and local laws, the rules and regulations of the 
Chicago Police Department, and CPIC policies. Furthermore, all personnel who 
receive, handle, or have access to CPIC data and/or sensitive information will be 
trained as to those requirements. All personnel having access to the CPIC’s data 
agree to abide the following rules: 
 
1. CPIC’s data will be used only to perform official law enforcement 
investigative-related duties in a manner authorized by the user’s employer 
and CPIC. 
2. Individual passwords will not be disclosed to any other person except as 
authorized by the Department. 
3. Individual passwords will be changed if authorized personnel of the 
Department, the CPIC or any individual password holder suspects the 
password has been improperly disclosed or otherwise compromised. 
4. Background checks will be completed on personnel who will have direct 
access to CPIC. 
5. Use of CPIC’s data in an unauthorized or illegal manner will subject the 
user to denial of further use of the CPIC; discipline by the user’s 
employing agency, and /or criminal prosecution. 
Each authorized user understands that access to the CPIC can be denied or 
rescinded for failure to comply with the application restrictions and use 
limitations. 
 
V. Security Safeguard 
Information obtained from or through the CPIC will not be used or publicly 
disclosed for purposes other than those specified in the Memorandum of 
Understanding that each participating agency must sign. Information cannot be 
(1) sold, published, exchanged, or disclosed for commercial purposes; (2) 
disclosed or published without prior approval of the contributing agency; or (3) 
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disseminated to unauthorized persons. 
Use of CPIC’s data is limited to those individuals who have been selected, 
approved, and trained accordingly. Access to information contained within the 
CPIC will be granted only to law enforcement agency personnel who have been 
screened with a state and national fingerprint-based background check, as well as any 
additional background screening process using procedures and standards 
established by Chicago Police Department. Each individual user must complete 
and Individual User Agreement in conjunction with training. 
The Crime Prevention and Information Center operates in a secure facility, 
protecting the CPIC from external intrusion. The CPIC will utilize secure internal 
and external safeguards against network intrusions. Access to CPIC databases 
from outside the facility will only be allowed over secure networks. The CPIC 
will store information in a manner that cannot be added to, modified, accessed, 
destroyed, or purged except by personnel authorized to take such action. 
 
VI. Openness 
It is the intent of the participating agencies to be open with the public concerning 
data collection practices when such openness will not jeopardize ongoing criminal 
investigative activities. Participating agencies will refer citizens to the original collector 
of the data as the appropriate entity to address any concern about data accuracy and 
quality, when this can be done without compromising an active inquiry or investigation. 
CPIC is a collection of various databases, which allows the Department and 
participating agencies to share information and to accelerate the dissemination of 
information already collected. CPIC does not change or alter a citizen’s rightful 
access to information accorded to them under state law. The CPIC will post the 
Privacy Policy on the premises of the CPIC and make it available to any 
interested party. 
 
VII. Individual Participation 
The data maintained by CPIC is provided, on a voluntary basis, by the 
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participating agencies or is information obtained by other sources. Each 
individual user searching against the data as described herein will be required to 
acknowledge that he or she remains solely responsible for the interpretations, 
further dissemination, and use of any information that results from the search 
process and is responsible for ensuring that any information relied upon is 
accurate, current, valid and complete, especially before any official action is taken in full 
or partial reliance upon the information obtained. 
Members of the public cannot access individually identifiable information, on 
themselves or others, from the CPIC’s applications. Persons wishing to access 
data pertaining to themselves should communicate directly with the agency or 
entity that is the source of the data in question. Participating agencies agree that they will 




When a query is made to any of the CPIC’s data applications, the original request is 
automatically logged by the CPIC‘s Event Manager Statistical Electronic Log system 
which will identify the user initiating the query. When such information is disseminated 
outside the agency from which the original request is made, a second dissemination log 
must be maintained in order to correct possible erroneous information and for audit 
purposes, as required by applicable law. Secondary dissemination of information can 
only be to a law enforcement agency 
for law enforcement investigative purpose or other agencies as provided by law. 
The agency from which the information is requested will maintain a record (log) 
of any secondary dissemination of information. This record will reflect as a 
minimum: 
1. Date of release 
2. To whom the information relates 
3. To whom the information was released (including address and telephone 
number) 
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4. All identification numbers or other indicator that clearly identifies the data 
released 
5. The purpose for which the information was released 
The Chicago Police Department will be responsible for conducting or 
coordinating audits and investigating misuse of CPIC's data or information. All 
violations and/or exceptions shall be reported to the Chicago Police Department 
Deployment Operations Center. Individual users of the CPIC’s information 
remain responsible for their legal and appropriate use of the information 
contained therein. Failure to abide by the restrictions and use of limitations for the use of 
CPIC’s data may result in the suspension or termination of use privileges, discipline 
sanctions imposed by the user’s employing agency, or criminal prosecution. Each user 
and participating agency in the CPIC is required to abide by this Privacy Policy in the use 
of information obtained by and through the Chicago Police Department's CPIC. 
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APPENDIX C.  MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT’S FUSION 
CENTER PRIVACY POLICY 
HOMELAND SECURITY BUREAU – MIAMI-DADE FUSION CENTER 
PRIVACY POLICY 
 
The Miami-Dade Police Department’s Homeland Security Bureau is a Fusion Center 
(herein referenced to as “HSB” or “Center”) as defined below: 
 
The HSB was initiated in response to the increase need for timely information sharing 
and exchange of crime related information among members of the law enforcement 
community. One component of HSB focuses on the development and exchange of 
criminal intelligence. This component focuses on the criminal intelligence process where 
information is collected, integrated, evaluated, analyzed and disseminated. 
 
The goal of establishing and maintaining the Miami-Dade Police Department’s 
Homeland Security Bureau / Miami-Dade Fusion Center criminal intelligence system is 
to: 
 
 Increase public safety and improve national security. 
 
 Minimize the threat and risk of injury to citizens. 
 
 Minimize the threat and risk of injury to law enforcement and others responsible 
for public protection, safety or health. 
 
 Minimize the threat and risk of danger to real or personal property. 
 
 Protect individual privacy, civil rights, civil liberties, and other protected interest. 
 
 Protect the integrity of the criminal investigatory, criminal intelligence, and 
criminal justice system process and information. 
 
 Minimize reluctance of individuals or groups to use or cooperate with the justice 
system. 
 
 Promote governmental legitimacy and accountability. 
 









The Mission of the Miami-Dade Police Department’s Homeland Security Bureau / 
Miami-Dade Fusion Center is to enhance partnerships which foster a connection between 
every facet of the law enforcement community. HSB will afford the men and women, 
who are dedicated to protecting the public and addressing violence, with all available 
intelligence resources and communications capabilities. Unless readily shared, critical 
information is without value. 
 
HSB’s criminal intelligence products and services will be made available to law 
enforcement agencies and other criminal justice entities with a demonstrated right and 
need to know. All agencies who participate in HSB will be subject to a Memorandum of 
Understanding and will be required to adhere to all HSB’s policies and security 
requirements. The purpose of this Privacy Policy is to ensure safeguards and sanctions 
are in place to protect personal information as information and intelligence are developed 
and exchanged. 
 
All Center personnel will comply with all laws protecting privacy, civil rights and civil 
liberties and adhere to the guidelines set forth in 28CFR Part 23. HSB will provide a 
printed copy of this policy to all department and non department personnel who provide 
services and will require of both a written acknowledgement of receipt of this policy and 




HSB’s Privacy Policy has eight Privacy Design Principles which shall guide the policy 
and practices wherever applicable. The eight Privacy Design principles are: 
 
1. Purpose Specification – Define the HSB’s purpose for information to 
help ensure the agency uses of information is appropriate. 
2. Collection Limitation – Limit the collection of personal information to 
that required for the purposes intended. 
3. Data Quality – Ensure data accuracy 
4. Use Limitation – Ensure appropriate limits on Department use of personal 
information. 
5. Security safeguards – Maintain effective security over personal 
information 
6. Openness – Maintains a citizen access to information available through 
the Freedom of Information Act. 
7. Individual Participation – Allow individual’s reasonable access and 
opportunity to correct errors in their personnel information held by the 
Agency. 
8. Accountability – Identify, train and hold agency personnel accountable 
for adhering to agency information quality and privacy policies. 
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I. Purpose Specification 
  
HSB has developed databases by using existing data sources from federal, state 
and local law enforcement agencies. HSB will have the capability to combine data 
with the goal of identifying, developing and analyzing information related to 
violent crime or terrorist activity for investigative leads. This capability will 
facilitate integration and exchange of information between participating law 
enforcement agencies. 
 
II. Collection Limitation 
 
HSB is maintained for the purposes of developing information and criminal 
intelligence by agencies who participate in the Center. The decision of an agency 
to participate in Center and which databases provide information is voluntary. 
Information obtained and disseminated by a law enforcement agency outside of 
Miami-Dade will be governed by that agency’s local, state and federal laws as 
well as their respective policies. 
 
Because the laws, rules or policies governing information and criminal 
intelligence that can be collected and released on private individuals will vary 
from agency to agency, limitations on the collection of data concerning 
individuals is the responsibility of the collector of the original source data. 
Therefore, each contributor of information is under different legal restraints and 
restrictions. Each agency has its own responsibility to abide by the collection 
limitations applicable to it by reasons of law. Information contributed to the 
center should be that which has been collected in conformance with those 
limitations and has been vetted for legal sufficiency. 
 
III. Data Quality 
 
The agencies participating in the Miami-Dade Police Department’s Homeland 
Security Bureau / Miami-Dade Fusion Center remain the owners of the data 
contributed and are, therefore, responsible for the quality and accuracy of the data 
accessed by the Center. Inaccurate personal information can have a damaging 
impact on the person concerned and on the integrity and functional value of the 
Center. In order to maintain the integrity of the center, any information obtained 
through the Center must be independently verified with the original source from 
which the data was extrapolated before any official action (e.g., warrant or arrest) 
is taken. User agencies and individual users are responsible for compliance with 
respect to use and further dissemination of such information and the purging and 
updating of the data. Each contributor or contributing agency is solely responsible 
for data accuracy and quality. 
 
The provisions set forth in this Privacy Policy will be reviewed annually during 
the first month of the year. 
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IV. Use Limitation 
 
Information obtained from or through the HSB can only be used for lawful 
purposes. A lawful purpose means the request for data can be directly linked to a 
law enforcement agency’s active criminal investigation or is a response to a 
confirmed lead that requires follow-up to prevent a criminal act.  
 
The primary responsibility for the overall operation of the Miami-Dade Police 
Department’s Homeland Security Bureau / Miami-Dade Fusion Center will rest 
with the Major of the Homeland Security Bureau of the Miami-Dade Police 
Department. The Major will enforce the Privacy Policy of the HSB and take the 
necessary measures to make certain that access to the HSB’s information and 
resources is secure and will prevent any unauthorized access or use. The Miami-
Dade Police Department reserves the right to restrict the qualifications and 
number of personnel who will be accessing HSB and to suspend or withhold 
service to any individual violating this Privacy Policy. The Department, or 
persons acting on behalf of the Department, further reserves the right to conduct 
inspections concerning the proper use and security of the information received 
from the center. 
 
Security for information derived from HSB will be provided in accordance with 
all applicable federal, state and local laws, the rules and regulations of the Miami-
Dade Police Department, and HSB policies. Furthermore, all personnel who 
receive, handle, or have access to HSB data and/or sensitive information will be 
trained as to those requirements. All personnel having access to the HSB’s data 
agree to abide the following rules: 
 
1. HSB’s data will be used only to perform official law enforcement 
investigative-related duties in a manner authorized by the user’s employer 
and HSB. 
2. Individual passwords will not be disclosed to any other person except as 
authorized by the Department. 
3. Individual passwords will be changed if authorized personnel of the 
Department, the HSB or any individual password holder suspects the 
password has been improperly disclosed or otherwise compromised. 
4. Background checks will be completed on personnel who will have direct 
access to HSB. 
5. Use of HSB’s data in an unauthorized or illegal manner will subject the 
user to denial of further use of the HSB; discipline by the user’s 
employing agency, and /or criminal prosecution. 
 
Each authorized user understands that access to the HSB can be denied or 




V. Security Safeguard 
 
Information obtained from or through the HSB will not be used or publicly 
disclosed for purposes other than those specified in the Memorandum of 
Understanding that each participating agency must sign. Information cannot be 
(1) sold, published, exchanged, or disclosed for commercial purposes; (2) 
disclosed or published without prior approval of the contributing agency; or (3) 
disseminated to unauthorized persons. 
 
Use of HSB’s data is limited to those individuals who have been selected, 
approved, and trained accordingly. Access to information contained within the 
HSB will be granted only to law enforcement agency personnel, sworn or non-
sworn, who have been screened with a state and national fingerprint-based 
background check, as well as any additional background screening process using 
procedures and standards established by the Miami-Dade Police Department.  
 
The Miami-Dade Police Department’s Homeland Security Bureau / Miami-Dade 
Fusion Center operates in a secure facility, protecting the HSB from external 
intrusion. The HSB will utilize secure internal and external safeguards against 
network intrusions. Access to HSB databases from outside the facility will only 
be allowed over secure networks. 
 
HSB will store information in a manner that cannot be added to, modified, 
accessed, destroyed, or purged except by personnel authorized to take such action. 
 
The Intelligence Section Lieutenant will serve as a security officer in addition to 
their regular supervisory duties. The Lieutenant will be responsible for the 
physical, procedural, and technical safeguards of the HSB. 
 
VI.  Openness 
 
It is the intent of the participating agencies to be open with the public concerning 
data collection practices when such openness will not jeopardize ongoing criminal 
investigative activities. Participating agencies will refer citizens to the original 
collector of the data as the appropriate entity to address any concern about data 
accuracy and quality, when this can be done without compromising an active 
inquiry or investigation. 
 
HSB is a collection of various databases, which allows the Department and 
participating agencies to share information and to accelerate the dissemination of 
information already collected. HSB does not change or alter a citizen’s rightful 
access to information accorded to them under state law. The HSB follows Florida 




VII.  Individual Participation 
 
The data maintained by HSB is provided, on a voluntary basis, by the 
participating agencies or is information obtained by other sources. Each 
individual user searching against the data as described herein will be required to 
acknowledge that he or she remains solely responsible for the interpretations, 
further dissemination, and use of any information that results from the search 
process and is responsible for ensuring that any information relied upon is 
accurate, current, valid and complete, especially before any official action is taken 
in full or partial reliance upon the information obtained. 
 
Members of the public cannot access individually identifiable information, on 
themselves or others, from the HSB’s applications. Persons wishing to access data 
pertaining to themselves should communicate directly with the agency or entity 
that is the source of the data in question. Participating agencies agree that they 
will refer request related to privacy or sunshine laws back to the originator of the 
information. 
 
VIII.  Accountability     
 
When a query is made to any of the HSB’s data applications, the original request 
is automatically logged by the HSB‘s Intelligence Analysis Supervisor or the 
Sergeant into the log system which will identify the user initiating the query. 
When such information is disseminated outside the agency from which the 
original request is made, a second dissemination log must be maintained in order 
to correct possible erroneous information and for audit purposes, as required by 
applicable law. Secondary dissemination of information can only be to a law 
enforcement agency for law enforcement investigative purpose or other agencies 
as provided by law. The agency from which the information is requested will 
maintain a record (log) of any secondary dissemination of information. This 
record will reflect as a minimum: 
 
1. Date of release. 
2. To whom the information relates 
3. To whom the information was released (including address and telephone 
number) 
4. All identification numbers or other indicator that clearly identifies the data 
released. 
5. The purpose for which the information was released. 
 
The Miami-Dade Police Department will be responsible for conducting or 
coordinating audits and investigating misuse of data information. All violations 
and/or exceptions shall be reported to the Miami-Dade Police Department’s 
Homeland Security Bureau / Miami-Dade Fusion Center. Individual users of the 
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HSB’s information remain responsible for their legal and appropriate use of the 
information contained therein. Failure to abide by the restrictions and use of 
limitations for the use of HSB’s data may result in the suspension or termination 
of used privileges, discipline sanctions imposed by the user’s employing agency, 
or criminal prosecution. Each user and participating agency in the Center is 
required to abide by this Privacy Policy in the use of information obtained by and 
through the Center. 
  
Training   
 
The Miami-Dade Police Department’s Homeland Security Bureau / Miami-Dade Fusion 
Center will always encourage training and provide and seek out specialized training 
programs for personnel assigned to the HSB.  The intent of training is to develop a 
culture of information analysis and information sharing within the Miami-Dade Police 
Department’s Homeland Security Bureau / Miami-Dade Fusion Center. 
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